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This paper studies the effect of the euro introduction on international FDI flows. 
Using country-pair data on 35 OECD economies during 1997-2008 and adopting the 
propensity score matching as identification strategy, we investigate the impact of 
the euro on capital reallocation. In general, the euro exhibits no significant impact 
on FDI. However, the effect becomes significant on the subset of EU countries, 
increasing FDI flows by 14.3 to 42.5 percent. Furthermore, we find that the EU 
membership fosters FDI flows much more than the euro, increasing FDI flows by 55 
to 166 percent. Among other FDI determinants, high gross domestic product, low 
distance between countries and low unit labor costs in target country have a 
positive effect on FDI. On the contrary, long-term exchange rate volatility deters 
FDI flows. 
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The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
In 1999, the euro was introduced as a common currency in eleven countries of the
European Union (EU). The establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
was viewed as a necessary step towards closer political and economic integration.
From the political perspective, the common currency was expected to become a
unifying symbol of European identity. From the economic perspective, the common
currency was supposed to enhance a free movement of capital which is a fundamental
principle of the EU. At the same time, it would promote trade through diminishing
transaction costs resulting from the elimination of exchange rate volatility (Rose
2000). In a broader context, the common currency was believed to ensure better
functioning of the European Single Market (Delors 1989).
The euro project has been generally supported by policymakers and politicians.
Expectations about the economic gains of a common currency were ambitious and
several waves of enlargement took place over the last decade (Table 1).1 Neverthe-
less, eurosceptics objected that one currency does not ￿t monetary needs of diverse
economies and the initial weak growth of the euro area only fueled their arguments.
Among academics, the decision to form a common currency area led to a huge
interest. The literature ranges from the assessment of the ful￿llment of Mundell-
McKinnon-Kenen criteria, evaluation of arguments in favor and against a currency
union (e.g. Giavazzi and Torres 1993), comparison of co-movements in macroeco-
nomic variables between the EU and the USA or the analysis of their asymmetric
shocks (e.g., Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993).
The debate on the contribution of a common currency to economic development
is vital. In our paper, we contribute to the mosaic of the impacts of a common
currency on the economy by investigating one speci￿c aspect of a common currency
￿the link between the introduction of the euro and the in￿ ow of foreign direct
investment (FDI). Two main research questions regarding euro and FDI are being
asked: ￿rst, has the common currency enhanced FDI ￿ ows for countries that adopted
the euro as compared with the rest of OECD countries and, second, has the euro
fostered capital reallocation for euro countries as compared with the rest of the EU?
In addition, the role of both economic and monetary integration is inspected and the
impact of introducing the euro is compared with the impact of the EU membership.
The euro exerts in￿ uence on many economic activities, one of them being the ￿ ow
of capital among countries resulting from the removal of restrictions on investment
location decisions (Baldwin et al. 2008). It is important to study and understand
￿rms￿international strategies as FDI is associated with higher economic growth,
developed technologies and knowledge spillovers among countries (Harris and Taylor
2005). Literature has shown that uncertainty negatively a⁄ects investment and,
more speci￿cally, that uncertainty about exchange rate movement has adverse e⁄ect
on FDI decisions (Carruth et al. 2000). In particular, a persistent deviation of the
exchange rate from the long run equilibrium negatively a⁄ects FDI ￿ ows (Campa
1993). Thus, it is natural to ask whether the elimination of the exchange rate
1Greece joined the club in 2001. The EMU was enlarged later by Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus
and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009 and the newest euro area member is Estonia which joined the
EMU in 2011. Thus, 17 of 27 EU countries now use the euro as an o¢ cial currency.
1movements resulting from the introduction of a common currency in￿ uences ￿rms·
long-term investment decisions and FDI in general.
The common currency can a⁄ect FDI in￿ ows through three channels: reduced ex-
change rate uncertainty, reduced transaction costs and increased price transparency.
First, the elimination of exchange rate risk leads to cost saving stemming from the
absence of a need for hedging, thereby positively a⁄ecting expected returns to ￿rms.
Many multinational enterprises (MNEs) are export-oriented and FDI serves mainly
as a production platform for their exports (Bergstrand and Egger 2006). Naturally,
a motivation of MNEs to locate their manufactures in the EMU increases as foreign
investors￿expansion into the euro area leads to an access to the rest of the euro area
countries and to the surrounding EU market. Secondly, the reduction of transac-
tion and operational costs associated with the use of many currencies decreases the
cost of capital ￿ ows. Thirdly, the common currency enhances price transparency,
facilitating a comparison of factor prices and costs calculations. Many investments
abroad are motivated by ￿rms￿e⁄ort to produce e¢ ciently and the endowment and
prices of primary factors of production ￿land, labor and capital ￿are important
determinants of ￿rms￿localization decisions.
Answering the question about the euro impact on capital reallocation through
FDI would bring about broad policy implications. Apart from traditional location
determinants (infrastructure, human capital), countries use various institutional fac-
tors to attract FDI. Speci￿cally, governments spend vast amounts of public money
on FDI promotion policies and investment incentive schemes. Thus, the quanti￿ca-
tion of the impact of the euro on FDI ￿ ows might become one of the factors under
consideration of the EU countries that have not adopted the euro so far. Further-
more, it may also indicate the advantage of a common currency for di⁄erent regions
or groups of countries, too.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze
global FDI ￿ ows and the role of the FDI in the EU. In Section 3 we review related
literature. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to methodology issues and data description
and Section 6 presents the identi￿cation strategy. In Section 7 we present our results
and robustness checks. Section 8 summarizes and presents concluding remarks.
2 FDI in the EU
Global FDI ￿ ows have grown dramatically over past three decades, increasing from
$54 billion in 1980 to $1,771 billion in 2008. In the 1980s and early 1990s, there
was an evident increasing trend in FDI to developing countries as productive factors
were emphasized as one of the most important motivation for FDI.2 These countries
capitalized on the advantage of lower productive costs, mainly labor costs, and their
share in global FDI ￿ ows rose from 14 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in 2008, as
shown in Table 2. There is a dip in world FDI ￿ ows starting in 2001 related
to the slowdown in the world economy and a decline in cross-border mergers and
acquisitions. After recovering during 2004-2007, there was a more recent decline in
2008, mainly due to an incoming economic and ￿nancial crisis. However, the overall
2Locating ￿rm￿ s activities to countries with the lowest production costs leads to vertical FDI.
2share of FDI ￿ ows to developing countries has remained signi￿cantly lower than the
share of ￿ ows to developed economies (37 vs. 57 percent in 2008).
Europe is absorbing about two thirds of total FDI in￿ ows to developed economies,
followed by North America with the share of 26 percent (Table 3). Besides being
the main recipient of world FDI ￿ ows, Europe is also the main source of these ￿ ows,
followed by the United States and Japan. Further disentangling the structure of
FDI ￿ ows, approximately 96 percent of FDI ￿ ows into Europe aim to the EU and
more than 66 percent into the EMU. From 1995, FDI in￿ ows to Europe have in-
creased, with an exception of periods 2001-2004 and 2008-2009 when the world FDI
￿ ows decreased due to a ￿nancial and economic crisis. However, it has remained the
prevalent global recipient of FDI ￿ ows.
The euro area, becoming a single huge market with more than 300 millions
consumers, is expected to attract FDI by its enormous size, economic power and
no exchange rate risk. FDI is often associated with indirect e⁄ects on host coun-
tries through spillovers on domestic suppliers, customers or ￿rms in general. These
spillovers are either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal FDI spillovers occur when
a new foreign company with a high productivity in￿ uences domestic competing
companies which are in turn forced to increase their e¢ ciency either by new tech-
nology implementation or by hiring new, better trained workers and managers (Ja-
vorcik 2004). Vertical FDI spillovers are represented by the in￿ uences of the foreign
company on domestic suppliers or consumers. Nevertheless, the literature on FDI
technology spillovers o⁄ers ambiguous empirical evidence. Using meta-analysis
approach, Havranek and Irsova (2010) examine numerous empirical FDI spillover
studies and they conclude that FDI spillover e⁄ect is positive only for certain situ-
ation, e.g. the impact on domestic suppliers. In this light, it will be interesting to
analyze the e⁄ect of the common currency on FDI.
3 Literature Survey
A rapid growth of investment ￿ ows in a globalized world economy over the last
decades has sparked academic interest in FDI determinants and the FDI e⁄ects
on both host and home economies. The empirical literature acknowledges that
foreign investors￿location decisions are in￿ uenced by ￿rm-level factors as well as
macroeconomic, geographic and institutional variables. One strand of literature on
the FDI determinants arises from the eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1997) which is also
known as OLI model.3 Based on the new trade theory it emphasizes ownership and
location advantages and analyzes FDI from the investors· point of view. Investors￿
decisions whether to become a multinational enterprise is examined mainly through
￿rm costs represented as plant-level costs and trade costs (Markusen and Venables
1998; Kleinert 2001). Another strand of literature looks at determinants of FDI
location from the perspective of country di⁄erences, attempting to identify how
country-level factors such as size, institutions, taxes, exchange rate, trade protection,
3OLI model is based on three categories of advantages of foreign investment: O ￿Ownership
advantage (trademark, entrepreneurial skills etc.), L ￿Location advantage (access to raw materials,
prices of production factors etc.), I ￿Internalization advantage (licensing, joint venture etc.).
3production factor prices and human capital endowment a⁄ect FDI ￿ ows.4
Literature focusing on the e⁄ect of exchange rate on FDI has two branches, one
examining the relation between exchange rate levels and international investment
￿ ows and the second focusing on the exchange rate volatility and the role of uncer-
tainty and expectations about future exchange rate. Studies based on the ￿rm-level
framework and the option theory ￿nd that greater exchange rate uncertainty in-
creases the outside option for ￿rms so that it pays o⁄ to delay their investment,
which depresses current FDI.5
Since the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), analysis of the
role of exchange rate uncertainty on FDI ￿ ows is supplemented by the aspect of
common currency and its impact on investment ￿ ows. The literature studying the
link between the euro and FDI ￿nds a signi￿cant positive impact of euro on FDI
(Petroulas 2007; Schiavo 2007; De Sousa and Lochard 2006; Buch et al. 2003).
However, there is no accordance regarding the size of the e⁄ect, therefore the exact
magnitude of the impact of the euro on FDI remains unclear.
Baldwin et al. (2008) highlight that usual shortcoming preventing a proper esti-
mation of the euro e⁄ect on FDI is a less-developed methodology and identi￿cation
strategy. In our paper, we use a rigorous identi￿cation technique to obtain more
reliable estimates on the common currency impact on international investment.
Standard approach to analyze the impact of euro on FDI employs a gravity model
augmented with a dummy variable for a common currency. De Sousa and Lochard
(2006) investigate FDI decision of a ￿rm to set up an a¢ liate abroad and estimate
the e⁄ect of euro on FDI for 21 OECD countries. They ￿nd that a common currency
has a positive impact on FDI within the euro area. They also ￿nd that impact of
euro on FDI is higher in the EU peripheral countries like Greece or Italy. When
they drop these two countries from the sample, the e⁄ect of euro on FDI decreases
by 10 percentage points to 19 percent. However, the question whether the euro has
attracted also capital from the rest of the world is not addressed. Petroulas (2007),
using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach for a panel of unilateral FDI ￿ ows for 18
countries, tackles also this issue as he explores changes in FDI ￿ ows within euro
area, between euro area countries and non-euro area countries, and between non-
euro area countries, too. He ￿nds that the introduction of euro raised inward FDI
￿ ows by approximately 16 percent within the euro area and by about 11 percent for
non-member states. FDI ￿ ows from the non-member countries into the euro area
increases by 8 percent. On the same note, Schiavo (2007) estimates the e⁄ect of
a common currency on bilateral FDI ￿ ows among 25 OECD countries applying a
gravity-type empirical model with a parsimonious set of explanatory variables. He
concludes that a reduction in exchange rate uncertainty due to the introduction of
euro increases cross-country investment ￿ ows by 160 to 320 percent. An alternative
speci￿cation using three-year averages in order to eliminate a high variability in FDI
￿ ows decreases the magnitude to 70 to 250 percent. The endogeneity of FDI with
respect to GDP is partly resolved by the use of ￿xed e⁄ects. However, the wide
4Bloningen (2005) o⁄ers a good survey of literature on FDI determinants.
5Dixit (1989) theoretically models ￿rm￿ s entry and exit decisions under uncertainty and Carruth
et al. (2000) provide a complete survey of empirical literature on exchange rate volatility and FDI
based on the option theory.
4range of the results suggests that estimates should be interpreted with caution.
The majority of mentioned papers (Sousa and Lochard 2006; Petroulas 2007;
Schiavo 2007) use country-pair ￿xed e⁄ects, capturing time-invariant heterogeneity
between country-pairs, thereby reducing concerns about endogeneity of investment
￿ ows. However, this variation includes also time-invariant observable controls (e.g.
common language) and, consequently, precludes the quanti￿cation of their impact
separately. This poses a serious concern for a validity of the use of gravity model,
as the model￿ s intuition is built behind the incorporation of time-invariant factors
like land area and distance between countries.
Apart from examining FDI ￿ ows using the data from balance of payments, there
are studies inspecting plant-level micro data. Buch et al. (2003) analyze the im-
pact of euro on German data from a mandatory ￿rm-level survey organized by the
Bundesbank.6 They ￿nd that FDI from the EU signi￿cantly increases after the in-
troduction of the euro. The e⁄ect is present to a smaller extent also for non-euro
countries. The advantage of their approach is the use of reliable ￿rm-level data as
compared to general capital account FDI data. However, they face the problem
of using a single nation￿ s data and the uncertainty that the results are driven by
national asymmetric shocks. These suspicions are partly con￿rmed by Petroulas
(2007) who ￿nds that Germany and Belgium-Luxembourg act as a hub for FDI
￿ ows of the euro area.7 Thus, the size of the impact of the euro on FDI ￿ ows for
individual countries seems to be ambiguous as Schiavo (2007), contrary to Petroulas
(2007) and Sousa and Lochard (2006), does not ￿nd that any country faces higher
impact of euro on its FDI ￿ ows.
Summarizing, exchange rate uncertainty has received a considerable interest in
the empirical literature on FDI in recent years. However, all papers work with
the data ending by the year 2001 or 2002, and thus the question whether the euro
has in￿ uenced ￿rms￿long-term investment decisions and actually their decisions on
FDI has still remained mostly unanswered. Furthermore, since the common currency
a⁄ects international investments via various channels, we might be suspicious that
some of these channels might need a longer period for transmission than two or three
years after the common currency is introduced. Therefore, our paper investigates
the impact of the euro using the data on FDI ￿ ows until 2008. It allows us to
examine the e⁄ect of common currency on FDI in the longer period (nine years
after EMU establishment) and to shed light on foreign investor￿ s motivation by
including countries from the latest wave of the euro area enlargement.
4 Methodology
We adopt the approach commonly used in the trade literature employing the gravity-
equation model specifying trade ￿ ows between countries as a function of the GDP of
6In general, ￿rm-level studies on FDI issues are not numerous due to unavailable or insu¢ cient
data.
7After excluding Germany and Belgium-Luxembourg, most of the euro e⁄ect disappears. On
the other hand, if they are excluded only as a receiver country or only as an investor country, the
euro e⁄ect remains nearly the same.
5each country and the distance between these two countries.8 Recently, the gravity
equation models have proven to be useful also in explaining international investment
￿ ows.9 The focus is put on time-invariant exogenous and policy variables so that
endogeneity problem is eliminated. Explanatory variables such as geographic dis-
tance, cultural ties (common language) and policy changes are used. The advantage
is taken from the fact that panel data makes it possible to analyze structural policy
breaks. In our paper, such an exogenous break is represented by the accession of a
country to the euro area.
The model thus combines institutional factors with environmental factors. The
traditional gravity literature (e.g., Brainard 1997) speci￿es ￿nancial ￿ ows between
countries as a function of various institutional and geographical factors. Following
this approach, the amount of FDI ￿ ow from a country i into a country j at time t
can be expressed as
lnFDIijt = ￿(lndistij;lnGDPijt;lnULCijt;EERSRijt;EERLRijt;
borderij;langij;t;EUijt;euroijt); (1)
where FDIijt is FDI ￿ ow from a country i into a country j , dist represents the ge-
ographical distance between countries, GDP stands for a product of gross domestic
products, ULC is a ratio of exchange rate adjusted unit labor costs, EERSR stands
for a short-term exchange rate volatility and is expressed as a two-year coe¢ cient of
variation of a ratio of countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rate indices, EERLR stands
for a long-term exchange rate volatility and is expressed as a ￿ve-year coe¢ cient of
variation of a ratio of countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rate indices, border indicates
a common border, lang is a dummy indicating countries share the same language,10
t is a time trend capturing changes in FDI ￿ ows a⁄ected by aggregate factors (e.g.
macroeconomic factors) common to all countries, EU is a dummy indicating pres-
ence of both countries in the EU and euro is a dummy indicating that both countries
belong into the euro area.
The semi-log functional form is chosen over the linear speci￿cation due to a better
￿t of the model. Given the skewness of FDI data, this speci￿cation leads more likely
to robust standard errors (Bloningen and Davies 2004). Moreover, it reduces the
weight of outliers with very large FDI ￿ ows and it allows us to interpret the estimated
coe¢ cients of continuous variables as elasticities. However, this transformation is
at the expense of losing information from negative ￿ ows.
The abovementioned variables are traditional determinants of FDI ￿ ows, each
having its economic rationale.11 The size of the two economies measured as a prod-
uct of their GDP approximates the market potential of these countries. Empirical
literature ￿nds that increasing size of two economies enhances FDI ￿ ows between
8Anderson (1979) presented a theoretical foundation for the gravity model. This approach has
widely been used to inspect trade ￿ ows between countries (e.g. Anderson and Wincoop 2003).
9Frankel and Wei (1996) ￿rst applied the gravity equations on FDI ￿ ows.
10In case a country has more than one o¢ cial language, it is su¢ cient if any of these languages
is shared with the second country in a pair.
11Billington (1999) o⁄ers summary of economic and political determinants of FDI. Chakrabarti
(2001) examines the impact of the whole set of variables on FDI and checks their robustness to small
changes in conditioning information set. Mart￿n and VelÆzquez (1997) present FDI determinants
for OECD countries.
6them. International price competitiveness expressed by unit labor costs a⁄ects FDI
negatively. An improvement in ULC may occur via increases in labor productivity
or cuts in taxes and the size of this e⁄ect on FDI depends on the sensitivity of a
particular type of FDI. The sensitivity of FDI to a change in unit labor costs varies
across sectors; FDI demanding highly quali￿ed labor force is not very sensitive, while
FDI demanding low quali￿ed labor force is very sensitive to changes in unit labor
costs.12 The e⁄ective exchange rate as a measure of whether a currency is appre-
ciating or depreciating to the exchange rate against a basket of foreign currencies
with whom the country trades enhances the e⁄ect of exchange rate and its volatility
on FDI ￿ ows. The literature supposes negative relation between FDI and exchange
rate volatility as volatility increases macroeconomic uncertainty, thereby reducing
the attractiveness of domestic assets. We distinguish between short term volatility
of exchange rate and long term misalignments. The distance between countries is
another factor a⁄ecting FDI location mechanism. Empirical literature typically ￿nds
that it has a negative impact on FDI ￿ ows as greater distance between countries
makes a foreign a¢ liation more di¢ cult to establish, manage and monitor (Egger
and Pfa⁄ermayer 2001). Following the same logic, the border dummy is expected
to a⁄ect FDI ￿ ows positively as common border represents smaller communication
costs and closer ties between countries. The e⁄ect of the common language on FDI is
expected to be also positive as the common language decreases communication costs
for FDI ￿ ows. These three variables - geographical distance, border and language
are often named as cultural distance - are proxies for time-invariant asymmetries
between countries which can strengthen the investment linkages between countries.
The EU membership captures the overall bene￿ts of the single market on FDI ￿ ows
and is expected to be positive. Finally, the euro dummy is pivotal for our paper as
it expresses the e⁄ect of the common currency on FDI.
5 Data
Annual FDI ￿ ows data during the period 1997-2008 are used for the analysis. The
availability of the such span presents an advantage over previously mentioned studies
on FDI impact of euro, which use only a limited number of years (one to three) after
the euro introduction. As the focus of this paper is the analysis of European FDI
￿ ows, the main source of the data on investment ￿ ows is Eurostat, compiling har-
monized FDI from regulatory reports to central banks and surveys ￿lled by resident
business units.13 It provides data on unilateral FDI ￿ ows for each reporting country
by partner country. Both FDI in￿ ows and out￿ ows are reported for 35 countries (29
OECD members and 6 non-OECD countries).14 The choice of countries is motivated
by the e⁄ort to cover FDI ￿ ows between the majority of European countries and
12Bellak et al. (2008) investigate the e⁄ect of labor costs on FDI.
13FDI benchmark de￿nition, according to OECD, regards FDI as a sum of ￿the net sales of
shares and loans (including non-cash acquisitions made against equipment, manufacturing rights,
etc.) to the parent company plus the parent ￿rm·s share of the a¢ liate·s reinvested earnings plus
total net intra-company loans (short- and long-term) provided by the parent company￿ .
14Out of a total number of 34 OECD countries, Luxemburg, Israel, Chile, Mexico and Switzerland
are omitted. Unit labor costs data for Switzerland are not available. In case of Luxemburg, balance
of payment data displays large FDI ￿ ows associated with the favourable bank environment which
7their major FDI partners. Overall, the data sample consists of 589 country-pairs,
providing us with an unbalanced panel of 11,457 observations.15
One-way outward investment ￿ ows FDIijt are used, representing investment
from country i to country j in period t. It can occur that FDI ￿ ow from country
i to country j is measured in two di⁄erent ways ￿ either reported by investing
country i as an out￿ ow to country j or reported by recipient country j as an in￿ ow
from country i. In reality, there is often a discrepancy between these two values.
There is no information indicating that any of these values is ￿better￿ , therefore,
we ameliorate this measurement error by constructing the average of the two series.
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics of covariates for both euro and non-
euro country pairs.16 The majority of observations belongs to non-euro country
pairs (10,367 vs. 1,090 observations). With the exception of FDI ￿ ows, exchange
rate volatility, language and border dummy, observable characteristics for euro and
non-euro pairs are not very di⁄erent. This is not surprising as most OECD Member
States are developed and quite homogenous economies. More important, it suggests
that the variance in FDI ￿ ows is not directly attributed to the level of GDP or
distance between countries.
Table 5 compares a trend of FDI for euro and non-euro pairs over time. It
illustrates the U-shaped behavior of both groups of country-pairs, with a modest
decline during 2000-2003, indicating that time trend is not a signi￿cant factor in
explaining the di⁄erence in FDI ￿ ows between euro vs. non-euro country pairs, too.
The source of unit labor costs data is OECD and we construct unit labor costs
ratio as a fraction of unit labor costs in an originating country over unit labor costs
in a recipient country. The source of data on GDP is the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the real e⁄ective exchange rate indices (REER) are obtained from
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) database.17 A short-term exchange rate
volatility is expressed as a two-year coe¢ cient of variation of a ratio of countries￿real
e⁄ective exchange rate indices and a long-term exchange rate volatility is expressed
as a ￿ve-year coe¢ cient of variation of a ratio of countries￿real e⁄ective exchange
rate indices. Additional data include geographical and cultural factors such as dis-
tance between countries (measured as a distance between capital cities), common
border and language dummies.
is not a primary focus of this paper. Israel, Chile and Mexico exhibit a considerable number of
missing values on bilateral FDI ￿ ows. Six non-OECD countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Romania.
15Although 35 considered countries constitute 35*34/2 = 595 country-pairs, we do not possess
information for FDI ￿ ows between Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea (6 country-
pairs) for any year during 1997-2008. Out of 589 country-pairs, there is information on both FDI
in￿ ow and out￿ ow during the whole period of 12 years for 191 country-pairs, the rest contains at
least one missing value. However, we have at least 20 observations for 353 country-pairs and at
least 10 observations for at least 567 country-pairs.
16As stated above, a pair is viewed as ￿euro pair￿during a given period when both countries
use the euro as a currency during this period. Otherwise (when one or both countries do not use
euro), the pair is referred to as non-euro pair.
17The BIS real efective exchange rate indices are calculated as geometric weighted average of a
country￿ s currency relative to an index of other major currencies adjusted for the e⁄ects of in￿ ation.
86 Econometric Analysis
Empirical results of euro impact on FDI have been less numerous than on other issues
concerning the impact of a common currency (e.g. trade e⁄ect), mainly due to a less
developed empirical methodology and a lack of data (Baldwin et al. 2008). A simple
OLS estimation may be potentially biased due to the self-selection of countries to
adopt the euro. Therefore, after presenting OLS results, we address this shortcoming
by exploiting variation in FDI ￿ ows before and after the introduction of the euro
and performing a Tobit estimation due to a left-censored character of the dependent
variable.18 Moreover, a pivotal aspect of our paper is that we account for a potential
selection bias for euro adoption: the estimation is performed only for a comparable
subset of country pairs matched by propensity score matching technique. Using this
approach, the analysis is based on the comparison of otherwise similar country-pairs
(identi￿ed by a similar propensity to share the euro), the only di⁄erence being the
adoption of euro.
6.1 Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimation
A di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimation allows us to exploit policy change and estimate
the impact of euro adoption on FDI ￿ ows. The following econometric speci￿cation
is estimated:
lnFDIijt = ￿1 lndistij + ￿2 lnGDPijt + ￿3ULCijt + ￿4EERSRijt + ￿5EERLRijt +
￿6borderij + ￿7langij + ￿8t + ￿1EUijt + ￿2euroijt + ￿ijt; (2)
where ￿1 and ￿2 are the coe¢ cients estimating the impact of the EU and the euro
on FDI ￿ ows, respectively.
However, because of data nature, using simple OLS regression would bias our
estimates. Due to disinvestment, reported FDI ￿ ow is often zero or even negative
which imposes a serious limitations when using logarithmic form of the dependent
variable.19 In order to exploit the maximum amount of information from the avail-
able dataset, data are modi￿ed in a way that also observations with negative FDI
￿ ows can be used. One possibility of data modi￿cation is to perform a transfor-
mation lnFDIijt ￿ ln(x + FDIijt), where x is a positive scalar (Gujarati 1995).
However, in such case, it would be di¢ cult to correctly interpret the parameter esti-
mates. Alternative transformation enables the adoption of the Tobit model (Tobin
1958), de￿ning the dependent variable in a following way:
lnFDIijt ￿ 0 if FDIijt ￿ 0
lnFDIijt ￿ ln(1 + FDIijt) if FDIijt > 0:
This speci￿cation of the dependent variable exhibits a left censoring threshold at
zero. Tobit estimation controls for this feature of the data and yields consistent
parameter estimates.
18Due to disinvestment, many FDI ￿ ows are negative, thereby precluding a conversion into a
logarithmic scale. These missing observation are considered as censored from the left.
19Out of 11,457 observations, 1,908 report negative FDI ￿ ows.
96.2 Propensity Scores Matching
A propensity score matching technique attempts to provide an unbiased estimation
of treatment e⁄ects using the approximation of a counterfactual outcome despite
the lack of experimental data (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). It allows us to match
country-pairs based on their observable characteristics and compare the potential
outcomes between country-pairs which share euro currency and the countries that
do not. In this way, we identify a control group of country-pairs with a similar
propensity of sharing euro which actually do not share the euro.
Let FDI1
ijt denote the value of FDI ￿ ow from country i to country j in the
case they both use euro at time t and let FDI0
ijt denote the level of FDI ￿ ows from
country i to country j in the case they do not share a common currency. The impact
of adopting the euro is then estimated as FDI1
ijt ￿ FDI0
ijt:
The main problem in identifying the e⁄ect of euro on FDI ￿ ows is that FDI
is observed only for one scenario of the treatment variable (euroijt) and remains
unobserved for the other. One way how to solve this problem is to use similar coun-
tries selected by some matching mechanism and use this group as an approximated
counterfactual. This identi￿cation strategy assumes that the potential amount of
FDI between countries that adopted the euro would be the same as was the amount
of FDI for the control group that did not adopt the euro:
E(FDI
0
ijtjeuro = 1) = E(FDI
0
ijtjeuro = 0): (3)
However, it is di¢ cult to match country-pairs based on many observable charac-
teristics. A more lucid way is to construct a one-dimensional metric as a matching
indicator. For this purpose, we employ a method uniting relevant observed charac-
teristics into a single score known as a propensity score matching. These propensity
scores are obtained from the probit equation estimating the probability of the event
that a country-par shares the euro as a function of speci￿ed independent variables.
The probability of receiving the treatment (sharing the euro) is estimated as
follows:
P(euroijt = 1) = ￿(lndistij;lnGDPcapijt;lnareaij;langij;bordij;landlockij) (4)
where P(euroijt = 1) stands for the probability that countries i an j both use the
euro at time t, dist represents the geographical distance between countries i and j,
lang is a dummy for the same language, bord states for a common border,landlock
is a number of landlocked countries in a country-pair, GDPcap is standing for the
product of countries￿GDP per capita and areaij as a product of the land mass of i
and j in km2.
After estimating the probit equation and obtaining the propensity scores, a
matching algorithm is de￿ned. Each treated pair, or in other words pair in which
both countries share a common currency, is matched to one or more control pairs
(depending on the matching technique) that consist of countries that do not share
a common currency. The di⁄erence in their FDI ￿ ows serves as an estimate of the
euro impact on FDI ￿ ows. The most common technique for matching is the nearest
neighbor (NN) matching in which euro-pair is matched to the non-euro pair with
10the most similar value of propensity score. Unmatched pairs are discarded. After-
wards, the gravity equation 2 is estimated only for matched country-pairs in order
to estimate the impact of the euro on FDI ￿ ows.
We perform two matching speci￿cations of probit equation - restricted and unre-
stricted, di⁄ering by the constraint applied to the potential control group. The un-
restricted speci￿cation does not constrain matched observations to be from the same
year, matching a combination of a country-pair/year to control country-pair/year.
In contrast, the restricted speci￿cation matches a treated country-pair to a control
country-pair from the same year. Thus, we estimate an alternative speci￿cation of
the probit equation:
P(euroij = 1) = ￿(lndistij;lnGDPcapij;lnareaij;langij;bordij;landlockij); (5)
where P(euroij = 1) is the probability that countries i an j adopted the euro
during 1999-2008 and lnGDPcapij denotes the logarithm of GDPcap as for 1998
(prior to the euro adoption). Including all observations for treated and control
country-pairs in di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimation (2), this restricted speci￿cation
e⁄ectively compares FDI ￿ ows from the same year (heterogeneity across country-
pairs is controlled by ￿xed e⁄ects and di⁄erences between years is partly captured
by the trend).
It is crucial to stress that the objective of the probit equation is not to build
a statistical or even a political model explaining the EMU membership in the best
possible way. It is even possible that some relevant variables a⁄ecting the euro
area membership are missing. Conversely, the close-to-perfect match would make
matching more di¢ cult as there would be only few country-pair matches with a
similar probability of sharing the euro, the only di⁄erence being the euro currency.
The imperfect prediction of the treatment does not present a problem as long as the
omitted variables are unrelated to other FDI determinants. Summarizing, the aim
is not to obtain the best ￿t for euro membership in probit estimation, but obtain a
tool to identify and evaluate the impact of the euro introduction on FDI ￿ ows.
A propensity framework setup requires the ful￿llment of some assumptions.
First, the potential amount of FDI in the case of not sharing the euro is equal
for euro and non-euro country-pairs so that the latter group can serve as an ad-
equate control group (conditional independence assumption). This assumption is
satis￿ed as the explanatory variables FDI equation include a vast set of indicators
a⁄ecting FDI ￿ ows such as distance between countries, variable for GDP measure,
unit labor costs ratio, exchange rate volatility, border and language dummies and
time trend, ￿ltering out heterogeneity in FDI ￿ ows caused by observable character-
istics. All remaining di⁄erences can be attributed to the common currency dummy.
Second, country-pairs with similar values of the relevant covariates have a positive
probability of sharing and non-sharing the euro (common support assumption). In
other words, there should be no signi￿cant di⁄erence between means of explanatory
variables in equation (4) for euro and non-euro country-pairs. Based on the descrip-
tive statistics displayed in Table 4 this condition is assumed to be satis￿ed. Third,
FDI of a country-pairs sharing the euro is not a⁄ected by another country-pair￿ s
euro or non-euro state (stable unit treatment value assumption). Here, it can not
be assumed that there are no spillovers as a particular country-pair￿ s assignment
11into the euro area might be a⁄ected by other country-pairs￿assignments.
Nevertheless, we can still make some inference about the impact of the euro by
rede￿ning the causal e⁄ect: instead of measuring the e⁄ect as ￿the di⁄erence between
what would have been observed in a world in which units received the treatment and
what would have been observed in a world where no treatment exists￿ , we de￿ne
the e⁄ect as ￿the di⁄erence between the particular unit￿ s observed outcome and
what would have been observed had that unit received no treatment.￿The average
of these estimated unit-level e⁄ects gives us the demanded estimate of the average
e⁄ect for the treated. Therefore, even in the absence of the stable unit treatment
value assumption, well-de￿ned causal question enables an attempt at an analysis.
7 Results
7.1 The Gravity Model
Results for several baseline speci￿cations using the full sample of country pairs
are reported in Table 6. The ￿rst speci￿cation is a simple OLS and the second
speci￿cation is Tobit estimation which accounts for the left-censoring character of the
dependent variable. The third and fourth speci￿cations are augmented by country-
pair ￿xed e⁄ects, helping to control for unobserved heterogeneity among various
country-pairs.
Before focusing on a relationship between a common currency and FDI ￿ ows, we
brie￿ y present the results for other explanatory variables. Results con￿rm the idea
behind a gravity model ￿the product of countries￿GDP has positive and signi￿cant
impact on FDI ￿ ows, indicates the link between economic strength of particular
countries in a country-pair and FDI ￿ ows.20 Geographical distance between two
economies has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect as expected. On the same note, common
border and a common language (measuring a cultural proximity) both exhibit a
positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI ￿ ows. These ￿ndings con￿rm the positive role
of geographic factors in FDI allocation.
Unit labor cost variable indicates that the higher relative labor costs in origi-
nating country, the higher the FDI ￿ ow in recipient country, which is also in line
with a theoretical proposition that investors seek cheap labor force. Finally, we ￿nd
negative impact of exchange rate long term volatility while short term volatility re-
mains insigni￿cant. These ￿ndings re￿ ect an easier and less expensive possibility of
￿rms to insure against the risk of short term volatility by foreign exchange market
instruments, meanwhile the long run exchange rate misalignments are more costly
and hardly avoidable, therefore they have a deterrent e⁄ect on FDI ￿ ows.
20In our regressions we use the log of the product of the gdpijt, assuming that the coe¢ cient on
"sender country GDP" should be equal to the coe¢ cient on "receiving country GDP". We also
tried an estimation with a less constrained speci￿cation, namely one coe¢ cient for log (gdpi) and
another for log (gdpj) and, the coe¢ cients were not statistically di⁄erent.
127.2 EU vs. Euro impact
Following with the interpretation of the results displayed in Table 6, the main con-
tribution is the segregation of the e⁄ect of EU membership on FDI ￿ ows from that
of the EMU membership. In a simple OLS speci￿cation, the impact of euro is
estimated to be positive. However, in more appropriate speci￿cations accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity (￿xed-e⁄ects) or left-censoring (Tobit), this e⁄ect be-
comes insigni￿cant. On the contrary, the magnitude of the EU dummy capturing
the bene￿ts of the common market remains signi￿cant even with the inclusion of
￿xed e⁄ects. As can be observed in last column, the EU membership increases bi-
lateral FDI ￿ ows by exp(0.732)-1 = 107.9 percent.21 On the other hand, the EMU
impact is insigni￿cant, increasing FDI ￿ ows only by exp(0.138)-1 = 14.8 percent.
The ￿ndings from the baseline speci￿cations become even more robust by using
the propensity score matching technique. Elaborating the analysis, the Tobit esti-
mation is run only for country-pairs matched by propensity score matching. Table
7 reports the coe¢ cients for the EU and the euro variables. Under unrestricted
matching (linking country-pair in a particular year to other country-pairs in other
years), the impact of belonging to the EU on FDI ￿ ows ranges from 54.5 to 71.9
percent. In restricted-matching speci￿cation (matching treated country-pair with a
control country-pairs and using this match for the whole period), this impact in-
creases to 150.7 to 166.2 percent. On the contrary, the e⁄ect of sharing the euro
ranges around zero (from -5.6 to 7.4 percent) and is clearly insigni￿cant. Smith and
Todd (2004) ￿nd that restricted matching estimators are more robust as they allow
for time-invariant unobservable di⁄erences in outcomes between euro country-pairs
and non-euro country-pairs. Thus our preferred estimator is the restricted matching
estimator and the unrestricted estimates are performed as a robustness check. In
addition, the robustness of the results is checked also by employing various versions
of matching techniques.22
The sign and signi￿cance of other estimates are similar to those from baseline
speci￿cations. In particular, long-term exchange rate volatility reduces FDI between
countries, high gross domestic product in both originating and target country en-
courages FDI ￿ ows, while the distance between countries and the unit labor costs
gap decrease FDI ￿ ows.
Overall, the ￿ndings suggest a limited impact of the common currency on FDI
￿ ows. Being the EU member shows to be a far more crucial factor in FDI boost.
However, it should be noted that the euro adoption inherently reduces exchange rate
volatility. As a result, the coe¢ cient of the euro dummy in Table 7 captures the
21The interpretation of a dummy cooe¢ cient ￿ when the dependent variable is log-tranformed
is given by ￿ = 100*(exp(￿)-1).
22We use following matching techniques: three nearest neighbours (NN3), Radius matching and
Kernel matching. The di⁄erence among theme lies in the number of available comparasion units
and, more units for matches avoid the risk of bad matches.The NN3 allows matching of euro
country-pair to the weighted outcome of three nearest non-euro country-pairs. Radius matching
uses not only three nearest neighbours but also equally weights all of the comparison members
within the radius. And last Kernel matching requires that all euro-pairs are matched with a
weighted average of all non-euro pairs where weights are calculated using a kernel function and
weights are inversely proportional to the di⁄erences between propensity scores.
13part of the euro e⁄ect on FDI not caused by reduction of exchange rate volatility.23
7.3 Euro impact within EU
In our dataset, all countries using the euro are members of the European Union.24
In order to extend our analysis, we investigate the impact of a common currency
solely for the EU countries. It should be noted that the new sample does not contain
countries like U.S., Canada or Australia, which should be taken into consideration
when interpreting the estimates.
Table 8 presents the e⁄ect of the common currency on FDI ￿ ows within the
European Union. Under this baseline speci￿cation, the euro dummy is signi￿cant,
increasing bilateral FDI ￿ ows by exp(0.338)-1 = 40.2 percent. Table 9 shows esti-
mates obtained only on the subsample of the EU countries and limited by country-
pairs matched by propensity score matching. The euro increases bilateral FDI ￿ ows
by 16.8 to 42.5 percent in unrestricted speci￿cation and by 14.3 to 36.5 percent in
restricted speci￿cation. Overall, this ￿nding suggests that the common currency
positively a⁄ects FDI ￿ ows within a group of relatively integrated markets. These
results should be viewed in the context of the hypothesis of endogeneity assuming
that higher economic linkages among the members of currency union lead to the
creation of optimal currency union ex post (Frankel and Rose 1998). Thus, the ￿nd-
ings on the positive e⁄ect of the euro on FDI ￿ ows might indicate also a creation of
closer linkages between countries.
7.4 Time dimension of the euro e⁄ect on FDI ￿ ows
The results on the link between the common currency and FDI ￿ ows are slightly
contradictory to the existing literature on the FDI e⁄ect of the euro as most of the
existing literature ￿nds a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect (Petroulas 2007; Schiavo
2007). Two possible explanations of this discrepancy are of methodological and
time-dimensional nature, respectively. Firstly, the previous ￿ndings of a signi￿cant
and often huge impact of the euro on FDI ￿ ows might be biased due to selection
bias.25 Secondly, using data until 2001 or 2002, these studies su⁄er from a short
time span. Addressing this issue, we explore the time dimension of the euro impact
on FDI, analyzing separately the period 1997-2003 which corresponds roughly to
the time span used in previously mentioned studies.
Table 10 o⁄ers a comparison of estimates for the initial period (1997-2003) and
the full time span (1997-2008). The results reveal that the euro impact is more
23Indeed, excluding short-term and long-term exchange rate volatility variables from the model
slightly increases the euro impact; however, it remains statistically insigni￿cant. For the sake of
brevity, these results are not reported.
24Strictly speaking, it is possible for a country to use the euro without being the EU member.
There are formal agreements between the EU and Vatican City, San Marino and Monaco, specifying
the use of the euro as a legal tendar. In addition, Montenegro and Andorra use the euro without
a formal approval.
25According to Persson (2001), within-sample estimation might be seriously biased if the coun-
tries belonging to existing currency union are non-randomly selected. Applying propensity match-
ing technique, he contradicts the ￿ndings by Rose (2000) who ￿nds that a currency union expands
bilateral trade between two members by 200 percent or more.
14pronounced in the ￿rst years after the launch of the euro currency (ranging from
23.7 to 54.1 percent), becoming negligible only in the longer run. It should be
recognized that the euro dummy covers a di⁄erent set of country-pairs for di⁄erent
years as new countries adopted the euro as the o¢ cial currency.
The ￿ndings indicate a positive initial impact of the euro on FDI. However, this
e⁄ect is only temporary and vanishes over the upcoming years. A possible expla-
nation of this behavior might be a saturation of investors inclined to locate in the
euro area. Arguably, it can be concluded that the common currency union impact
is present in the form of one-o⁄ capital reallocation of multinational companies,
nevertheless, reverting to pre-euro levels in the longer run.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact of the euro currency on international FDI
￿ ows. Analyzing bilateral FDI ￿ ows between 35 developed countries during 1997-
2008, we estimate the di⁄erence in FDI ￿ ows for country-pairs sharing the euro
and country-pairs with at least one country using other currency. The identi￿cation
strategy is based on propensity score matching, ensuring that the control group of
districts contains only similar countries in terms of probability to introduce the euro.
The ￿ndings indicate that the impact of the euro on FDI ￿ ows is negligible
(-5.6 to 7.4 percent). Interestingly, the EU membership fosters FDI much more
that the euro, increasing FDI ￿ ows by 54.5 to 166.2 (depending on the matching
speci￿cation).
The e⁄ect of the euro on FDI ￿ ows, however, di⁄ers for the sample of OECD
countries and for the subsample of EU countries. In former case it does not signif-
icantly increase FDI ￿ ows, while in latter case it accelerates FDI ￿ ows by 14.3 to
42.5 percent.
The results suggest that the impact of the euro on FDI ￿ ows is smaller than
presented in recent literature. One reason of this discrepancy may be the use of
a more elaborated econometric technique (propensity score matching). Another
reason may the di⁄erent (longer) time span used in our study. Indeed, the short
time span of three years (used in prevous studies) shows a positive e⁄ect of the euro
on FDI also in our setup. Nevertheless, considering the high variability of FDI ￿ ows,
this impact should be interpreted with caution. The EU membership, being a more
dominant factor in FDI attraction that the euro, also contributes to a weakening
role of the euro over time.
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Table 1: A timeline of the euro area enlargement
EMU membership 1997-98 1999-2000 2001-06 2007 2008 2009-10 2011
Austria x x x x x x
Belgium x x x x x x
Cyprus x x x
Estonia x
Finland x x x x x x
France x x x x x x
Germany x x x x x x
Greece x x x x x
Ireland x x x x x x
Italy x x x x x x
Luxembourg x x x x x x
Malta x x x
Netherlands x x x x x x
Portugal x x x x x x
Slovakia x x
Slovenia x x x x
Spain x x x x x x
Note: Sign ￿x￿indicates EMU membership during a particular period of time.
18Table 2: World FDI ￿ ows by recipient country
FDI ￿ ows World Developing Transition Developed EU EMU
year bil. USD (at current prices) % % % % %
1980 54 14 0 86 39 -
1990 208 17 0 83 47 -
2000 1382 19 1 81 49 36
2001 825 26 1 73 47 35
2002 628 28 2 70 49 39
2003 566 33 4 82 46 39
2004 733 40 4 56 29 17
2005 986 34 3 63 51 27
2006 1459 30 4 67 40 23
2007 2100 27 5 69 43 28
2008 1771 37 7 57 30 17
Source: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
Note: According to UN methodology, countries are classi￿ed as developed economies, developing
economies or transition economies. The development of a country is represented by the Human
Development Index (HDI), a compound indicator integrating income per capita, life expectancy
and the rate of literacy.
Table 3: Annual FDI ￿ ows to developed economies
FDI ￿ ows Europe N. America Asia Oceania Developed Total
mil. USD (current prices)
1995 137 68 2 16 222
1997 155 115 5 10 285
1999 532 308 16 3 851
2001 395 187 8 11 601
2003 280 61 10 12 362
2004 218 136 11 45 410
2005 509 131 8 -23 625
2006 628 297 9 36 970
2007 988 375 31 49 1,444
2008 551 380 35 52 1,018
2009 378 149 16 23 566
Source: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
Note: North America is represented by the United States, Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint
Pierre and Miquelon.
19Table 4: Comparison of averages, euro vs, non-euro country-pairs (1997-2008)
euroij = 1 euroij = 0
log(FDIij) 4.49 2.77
log(GDPi ￿ GDPj) 39.19 37.62
log(distance) 7.14 7.84
ULC ratio 1.00 1.02
EER short 0.11 0.44
EER long 0.03 0.07
common border 0.18 0.06
common language 0.09 0.05
landlocked 0.18 0.24
# observations 1,090 10,367
Note: Dummy euroij equals 1 if both countries in a pair use the Euro currency; otherwise it
equals 0. FDIij stands for FDI ￿ ows from country i to country j in mil. USD, GDP is a gross
domestic product per capita in USD (de￿ ated to year 2000), ULC ratio is a ratio of exchange rate
adjusted unit labor costs in country i compared to country j, EER short is a two-year coe¢ cient
of variation of a ratio of countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rate indices, EER long is a ￿ve-year
coe¢ cient of variation of a ratio of counties￿real e⁄ective exchange rate indices, landlocked takes
values 0, 1 or 2 according to number of landlocked countries in a country-pair.
Table 5: Comparison of dependent variable means, by year
year euroij = 1 (# obs.) euroij = 0 (# obs.)
1997 2.50 679
1998 2.61 711
1999 4.83 78 2.37 708
2000 5.30 78 2.25 793
2001 4.70 98 1.02 892
2002 4.11 109 1.89 948
2003 4.17 110 1.87 989
2004 4.18 110 2.09 1026
2005 4.46 110 2.18 1047
2006 4.74 110 2.46 1060
2007 4.72 132 2.75 918




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21Table 7: The impact of the EU and the euro on FDI in￿ ow: matching
Model PSM algorithm NN3 Kernel Radius
EU Euro EU Euro EU Euro
Unrestricted coef 0.435￿ 0.014 0.508￿￿￿ -0.016 0.542￿￿￿ -0.013
std (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13)
% impact 54.5￿ 1.4 66.2￿￿￿ -1.2 71.9￿￿￿ -1.3
Restricted coef 0.979￿￿￿ 0.028 0.924￿￿￿ 0.022 0.919￿￿￿ -0.098
std (0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (0.15) (0.23) (0.21)
% impact 166.2￿￿￿ 2.5 152.1￿￿￿ 7.4 150.7￿￿￿ -5.6
Note: Table contains results of the Tobit estimation on the dataset containing treated country-
pairs with control country-pairs identi￿ed by propensity score matching: NN3 - nearest three
neighbors, kernel-matching, radius matching. The dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI
￿ ow from originating to recipient country. The impact on FDI ￿ ows in percentages is calculated as
100*(exp(coef)-1). Unrestricted speci￿cation performs matching of country-pair/year to a country-
pair/year, i.e., allows di⁄erent control country-pairs for di⁄erent years. Restricted speci￿cation
matches a country-pair with a di⁄erent country-pair (based on observables from 1998 ￿prior to
euro adoption) and uses this match for the whole period 1997-2008. Standard errors in parentheses.
Signi￿cance levels: *** 1%, ** 5 %, * 10%.
Table 8: Baseline results: Euro impact on FDI ￿ ows for EU countries
OLS Tobit FE(3) Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(GDPi ￿ GDPj) 0.627￿￿￿ (0.019) 0.786￿￿￿ (0.026) 0.821￿ (0.487) 0.285 (0.195)
log(distance) -0.855￿￿￿ (0.085) -1.091￿￿￿ (0.116)
ULC ratio 0.243 (0.353) 0.280 (0.480) 0.178 (0.367) 0.396 (0.416)
EER short 1.294 (2.899) 3.100 (3.933) -1.528 (2.685) -0.832 (3.698)
EER long -1.652 (1.745) -2.231 (2.391) 1.113 (2.314) 1.324 (3.107)
Euro 0.215￿￿ (0.102) 0.264￿ (0.138) 0.227 (0.149) 0.338￿ (0.205)
common border 0.343￿￿ (0.164) 0.302 (0.219)
common language 1.178￿￿￿ (0.183) 1.273￿￿￿ (0.245)
Country-pair dummies No No Yes Yes
Observations 3,966 3,966 3,966 3,966
1,141 censor. 1,141 censor.
R-2 adj. 0.356 pseudo 0.083 overall 0.301 pseudo 0.147
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI ￿ ow from originating to recipient country.
Time and country-pair dummies are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Signi￿cance
levels: *** 1%, ** 5 %, * 10%.
22Table 9: The impact of the euro on FDI in￿ ow for EMU countries: matching
Model Matching algorithm NN3 Kernel Radius
Euro Euro Euro
Unrestricted coef 0.354￿ 0.155 0.238￿
std (0.18) (0.15) (0.14)
% impact 42.5￿ 16.8 26.9￿
Restricted coef 0.311￿ 0.134 0.234
std (0.17) (0.15) (0.20)
% impact 36.5￿ 14.3 26.4
Note: The table contains results of the Tobit estimation on the dataset containing EU countries
during 1997-2008. The dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI ￿ ow from originating to recipient
country. Alternative PSM algorithms are used: NN1 - nearest neighbor, NN3 - nearest three
neighbors, kernel-matching, radius matching. The impact of the euro on FDI ￿ ows in percentages is
calculated as 100*(exp(coef)-1). Unrestricted speci￿cation performs matching of country-pair/year
to a country-pair/year, i.e., allows di⁄erent control country-pairs for di⁄erent years. Restricted
speci￿cation matches a country-pair with a di⁄erent country-pair (based on observables from 1998
￿prior to euro adoption) and uses this match for the whole period 1997-2008. Standard errors in
parentheses. Signi￿cance levels: *** 1%, ** 5 %, * 10%.
Table 10: The impact of the euro on FDI in￿ ow: matching by time period
Model PSM algorithm NN3 Kernel Radius
1997-2003 coef 0.280 0.213 0.432￿
std (0.24) (0.20) (0.26)
% impact 32.3 23.7 54.1
1997-2008 coef 0.024 0.071 -0.058
std (0.17) (0.15) (0.21)
% impact 2.5 7.4 -5.6
Note: The table contains results of the Tobit estimation with the logarithm of FDI ￿ ow from
originating to recipient country as a dependent variable. Alternative PSM algorithms are used:
NN1 - nearest neighbor, NN3 - nearest three neighbors, kernel-matching, radius matching. The
impact of the euro on FDI ￿ ows in percentages is calculated as 100*(exp(coef)-1). The speci￿cation
matches a country-pair with a di⁄erent country-pair (based on observables from 1998 ￿prior to euro
adoption) and uses this match for the whole period. Standard errors in parentheses. Signi￿cance
levels: *** 1%, ** 5 %, * 10%.
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